



# Access Control Based on Dynamic Monitoring for Detecting Software Malicious Behaviours

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# Motivation

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## Malicious software (or malware)

- software specifically designed to perform unauthorized actions to extract information from or damage a computing device.

## Common classes of malware include

- Viruses, Worms and Trojan horses
- Adware, Spyware
- Bots
- Phishing

## Controlling malware is an access control issue

- **Challenge:** how to identify and block their access

# A short taxonomy of malware detection methods

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## Signature based detection

- Scans a disk for characteristic content of known malware
  - (+) 100% detection rate
  - (-) Detects only known malware

## CRC checker

- Verifies whether files on disk have been modified
  - (+) 100% detection rate
  - (-) Detection is after the fact
  - (-) False positives

# A short taxonomy (cont'd)

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## Heuristic based detection

- Scanner examines overall code structure for signs of malicious logic.
  - (+) Detection before infection
  - (-) Easy to hide from the scanner
  - (-) False positive rates can be high



# Behaviour Based Detection

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- Detects and blocks malware based on specified behaviour.
- Some example behaviour could include:
  - Attempts to format a disk drive
  - Modification of start-up settings
  - Initiation of a network communication
  - Scripting of email to send executable files

(+) detects unknown malware

(+) not dependent on updates

(-) may cause false positives



# No perfect panacea

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## Most everyone agrees

- No one method is perfect: layered approach to detection is probably best

## More Control to user

- Behaviour based methods gives user some control over what type of behaviour he or she will tolerate.

# Basic architecture of a Behavior Based Malware Detection System

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1. Choose characteristics upon which to base behaviour detection
  - OS calls
  - Access to specific files
  - Access to registry keys
  - Access to communication ports
  - etc.
2. Collect behaviour data from running software application
3. Analyse collected data to determine if behaviour is deemed malicious
  - If so, block the application from executing further

# Virimon: A malware detector and blocker

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## Characteristic chosen

- OS calls

## Data collection

- Kernel level driver collects OS call information from running target application

## Analysis and reaction

- Uses model-checking to detect malicious behaviour
- Driver can block further execution



# Model Checking

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## Formal methods technique

- Verifies whether a model of a system satisfies some specified claim.

## Build a finite state model $M$ of the system

- Usually requires some simplification of the system

## Specify a claim $\sigma$ using a chosen logic

## Model-Checking algorithm

- Check that the model  $M$  satisfies  $\sigma$



# Virimon: modeling the system

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Modeling single execution of a software application

- Modeled as a sequence of OS calls

Represent model as a Finite State Automaton (FSA)

Each state  $s_i$  is a set of OS calls made

- A transition  $(s_i, l_i, s_{i+1})$  represents a particular OS call

The model is a possibly infinite set of transitions


# Example : a malicious text editor

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## Sequence of OS calls made by a text editor

- $i$ th call : open port
- $j$ th call : open file
- $k$ th call: write on port  
with  $i < j < k$

## Resulting FSA



# Virimon: Specifying the malicious behaviour

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## Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)

- Allows specification of a malicious behaviour in terms of temporal events

## Well-formed LTL formula

- built from state formula and temporal operators

## LTL claim for the text editor example

$$\diamond(\text{openfile} == \text{true}) \quad o \quad \diamond(\text{writeonport} == \text{true})$$

- “An OpenFile command is followed by the execution of a WriteOnPort command”

# LTL and FSA's

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
## LTL used

- To specify claims that represents malicious behaviour

## LTL claim

- can be converted to an FSA

In our example, the claim becomes



# Comparing the model against the malicious behaviour

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## Form the intersection of the 'languages'

- Of the model's FSA and
- Of the FSA of the malicious behaviour claim

## Determine if the intersection is empty or not

- if non-empty the claim holds



# Virimon: behavior based malware detector and blocker

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## Two main components

- Kernel level driver to intercept OS calls from target application
- Application level verifier implementing a model-checker (based on the SPIN project\*)

\*G. Holzmann. The model Checker SPIN. Software Engineering, 23(5):279-295,1997.



# Virimon driver: Driver OS call extractor

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## Kernel level driver

- Continually intercepts OS calls made by a targeted application
- Transmits each intercepted OS call to the verification module

## Verification module

- Builds an execution trace of the targeted application
- Checks the LTL formula against the execution trace
- Depending on the result of model-checking
  - Allows target application to proceed or
  - Blocks its execution





# Implementation details & improvements

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## LTL is a rich language

- Can be used to specify almost any desired property.

## 29 OS calls can be specified in Virimon, including (more to come)

- Openfile, WriteFile, ReadFile, CreateFile, QueryInformationFile, ...  
QuerySystemInformation, QuerySymbolicLinkObject, ...  
Createkey , Openkey, Deletekey ,EnumerateKey,...

## Parameters are not yet specifiable

- To be implemented in later version.

## Improve speed of model-checker

- Reduce waiting time while application is paused

## Reduce false alarms

- Research required



# Other possible uses of Virimon

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## Software Testing

- Allows tester to discover if a certain behaviour is present in a software application

## Software understanding

- Virimon will list the OS calls produced by the target application.

# Prototype

The screenshot displays the ViriMonApp interface with a trace log and a configuration dialog box. The trace log shows the following data:

#	Nom de l'image	PID	Fonction	Temps
13	BCMWLTRY.EXE	632	OpenKey()	20h49m59s645ms
14	BCMWLTRY.EXE	632	CreateKey()	20h49m59s645ms
15	BCMWLTRY.EXE	632	QueryValueKey()	20h49m59s645ms
16	BCMWLTRY.EXE	632	OpenKey()	20h49m59s645ms
17	BCMWLTRY.EXE	632	QueryValueKey()	20h49m59s645ms
18	BCMWLTRY.EXE	632	OpenKey()	20h49m59s645ms
19	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
20	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
21	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
22	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
23	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
24	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
25	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
26	BCMWLTRY.EXE			
27	UpdaterUI.exe			
28	services.exe			
29	services.exe			
30	csrss.exe			
31	csrss.exe	888	ReadFile()	20h49m59s666ms
32	csrss.exe	888	ReadFile()	20h49m59s666ms
33	csrss.exe	888	ReadFile()	20h49m59s676ms
34	UpdaterUI.exe	2628	ReadFile()	20h49m59s696ms
35	csrss.exe	888	ReadFile()	20h49m59s696ms
36	Svsystem	4	OpenFile()	20h49m59s706ms

The configuration dialog box, titled "Dialog", contains the following fields and controls:

- Entrer le nom de l'exécutable à vérifier:
- Entrer la formule de vérification:
- Buttons: !, u, i, [ ] (with arrow), <>, >>, OK, Reset, Cancel



# Conclusion

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Virimon is a behaviour based malware detector and blocker

- Powerful technique for malware detection
- Virimon is implemented in both kernel and application levels to control access

Formal methods in Virimon

- Allows a rich semantics for specifying malicious behaviour
- Guarantees that malicious behaviour will be found

A working prototype gives very promising results