



uOttawa  
L'Université canadienne  
Canada's university

LANCASTER  
UNIVERSITY



# Semantic-Based Interaction Detection in Aspect-Oriented Scenarios

Gunter Mussbacher<sup>1</sup>, Jon Whittle<sup>2</sup>, Daniel Amyot<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>SITE, University of Ottawa, Canada


<sup>2</sup>Dept. of Computing, Lancaster University, UK

September 4, 2009


# Background: Aspect-oriented Modeling

- Aspects address the problem of one concern **crosscutting** other concerns in a system or model
- Aspects can encapsulate concerns even if they are crosscutting

## Without Aspects



## With Aspects



Compositional Reasoning

(each aspect contains a **composition rule** illustrated by the arrows that defines where to add the aspect)

... 3 Crosscutting Concerns (Aspect1, Aspect2, Aspect3)



# Background: AO Requirements Engineering

- Improved support for separation of crosscutting functional and non-functional properties during requirements engineering
- Establish critical trade-offs even before the architecture is derived
- Improved understanding of the problem and ability to reason about it
- Today's focus is on **scenario models**



# Motivation (1)

- Aspect Interaction Problem
  - Multiple aspects may be applicable at a given point in the base model
- In the best case, aspects may simply be ordered
  - E.g., an aspect may assume certain modeling elements in the base are introduced by another aspect
- In the worst case, there may be deep semantic conflicts
  - E.g., inherent trade-offs between two non-functional aspects such as security and performance
    - Security mechanisms must be enforced → performance impact
    - Performance aspect may cache results → security implications



## Motivation (2)

- Our approach to address semantic interactions
  - Lightweight **semantic annotations** of aspect models
  - Model the semantic impact of aspects on each other in a **goal model** called an **influence model**
  - Identify and trade-off semantic aspect interactions with the influence model
  - Reason about stakeholder needs and aspect interactions with the help of built-in qualitative or quantitative evaluation mechanisms applied to the influence model




# Table of Contents


- Example: Electronic Voting Machine
  - Reporting Use Case (Base Model)
  - Aspects
  - Composed Model
- Goal-oriented Requirement Language (GRL)
- Goal Model for Electronic Voting Machine
- Summary of our Approach
- Case Study
- Conclusion and Future Work




# Electronic Voting Machine: Reporting Use Case




# Electronic Voting Machine: Authentication Aspect




# Electronic Voting Machine: Remote Service Aspect



# Electronic Voting Machine: Caching Aspect



# Electronic Voting Machine: Composed Model



# Goal-oriented Requirement Language (GRL)

- GRL is integrated with Use Case Maps (UCM), a scenario notation, in the User Requirements Notation (URN)
  - URN is the **first** and **currently only** standard which explicitly addresses goals in addition to scenarios in a graphical way in one unified language (International Telecommunication Union, ITU-T Z.150 series)
- GRL is based on  $i^*$  (concepts / syntax) and the NFR Framework (evaluation mechanism)
  - Ideally suited to capture **qualitative** relationships (as required by the influence model)
  - **Reason** about stakeholder needs and aspect interactions with the help of qualitative or quantitative evaluation mechanisms that are applied to the influence model




# Electronic Voting Machine: Goal Model

**Goal** (intermediate node for combining semantic markers)

**Softgoal** (for NFR addressed by aspect)

**Contribution** (for impact of semantic marker on its own aspect's NFR)



**Task** (for semantic markers)

**Decomposition**

**Correlation** (for impact of semantic marker on another aspect's NFR)

GRL Contribution Types:


-   
 Make
-   
 Some Positive
-   
 Help
-   
 Hurt
-   
 Some Negative
-   
 Break
-   
 Unknown



# Electronic Voting Machine: Evaluated Goal Model (1)

**Initial Satisfaction Level** (100 for semantic marker in use; indicated by \*)

**Propagated Satisfaction Level** (for each aspect's NFR)




**Initial Satisfaction Level** (0 for semantic marker not in use; default value)

GRL Satisfaction Levels:

Denied	Weakly Denied	None	Weakly Satisfied	Satisfied	Unknown	Conflict



# Electronic Voting Machine: Evaluated Goal Model (2)





GRL Satisfaction Levels:

Denied	Weakly Denied	None	Weakly Satisfied	Satisfied	Unknown	Conflict




# Summary

**Step 1:**  
Base and  
aspect  
models




**Step 2:**  
Composed  
scenario  
model



**Step 4: Evaluation of influence model**

## GRL Goal Model



Map semantic markers (SM) to initial satisfaction levels of strategies

**Step 3: Instantiation of influence model**

GRL ... Goal-oriented Requirement Language  
MATA ... Modeling Aspects Using a Transformation Approach



# Case Study – Methodology

- Can our technique detect semantic interactions in practice that cannot be found by applying syntactic interaction detection?
- Industrial Case Study: Software Defined Radio Application
  - 40 page document, 11 primary use cases + a number of auxiliary use cases, 8 UML sequence diagrams (SDs) – all not aspect-oriented
- ① Refactor original sequence diagrams to modularize crosscutting concerns
- ② Develop a set of semantic markers for each aspect domain and annotate the aspects with these markers
- ③ Develop an influence model for these markers and related non-functional requirements
- ④ Apply our techniques to detect syntactic interactions
- ⑤ Apply our techniques to detect semantic interactions




# Case Study – Results

- Base model with 5 SDs
- 4 aspect domains with 14 MATA SDs
- 11 semantic markers

id	Domain	Aspect
1A	Audit Trail	General Logging
1B	Audit Trail	Non-repudiation
2A	Security	Tamper Proof
2B	Security	Authorization
2C	Security	Authentication of Downloads
2D	Security	Decryption
2E	Security	Filtering
2F	Security	Authentication - General
2G	Security	Authentication of Keys
2H	Security	Encryption
3	Cache	Download
4A	Fault Tolerance	Reporting – Fault
4B	Fault Tolerance	Reporting – Failure
4C	Fault Tolerance	Retry

- Syntactic interactions
  - Benign / non-benign
- Semantic interactions
  - Type I: Performance conflict
  - Type II: Storage / security conflict
  - Type III: Functionality / security conflict
- Disjoint



# Case Study – Lessons Learned

- Results show that our techniques do indeed discover interactions not discoverable by our earlier efforts on syntactic interactions
- Usefulness beyond interactions
- Application during iterative modeling
- False positives
- Granularity of markers
- Return on investment
- Scalability and complexity



# Conclusion and Future Work

- Presented an approach for semantically detecting interactions between aspect models based on lightweight semantic annotations
- Tool support
  - MATA tool for UML SD (jUCMNav for AoUCM), jUCMNav for GRL
  - Not fully automated at this point
- The case study presented here constitutes only a first step in a longer term planned validation effort
  - Further empirical studies are needed to compare the benefits versus the additional effort required
  - Reusable, generic aspects and incrementally defined influence model?
- Use existing, domain-specific, standardized profiles for lightweight semantic annotations
  - Proved too complicated or did not cover the required domains

